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summary 
The role of finance in rural development has received 
increasing attention in Latin America and the Caribbean during 
the last decade. The acceleration of inflation and of foreign 
indebtedness, the urban bias of financial development, and the 
observed deficiencies of traditional agricultural-credit programs 
explain this increasing concern. Unfortunately, most financial 
reforms in the Hemisphere have bypassed rural financial markets 
(RFMs) and have ignored the special problems associated with 
agricultural finance. Although an improved provision of finan-
cial services depends upon the growth and integration of the 
national market, also policies, institutions, regulations, incen-
tives, and procedures must be revised in order to meet the special 
problems of rural finance. RFM development presents challenges 
of institution building, inter-market linkages, and innovation in 
financial technologies that go beyond policy reform, but these 
will not be met if the policy environment is repressive. 
The most basic indicator of financial progress is a reduc-
tion of transaction costs that lowers the total cost of funds 
for borrowers, increases the net returns to depositors, or 
both. Except when they are the result of excessive regulation, 
transaction costs cannot be reduced by decree. In particular, 
interest-rate ceilings do not usually make credit cheap, given 
their impact on access to loans and on the non-interest costs of 
borrowing. Rather, transaction costs will decline with competi-
tion and market integration, economies of scale and scope, the 
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financial and non-financial policies are powerful determinants 
of the performance of any intermediary. 
In order to reach the rural population with financial 
services it will not be sufficient to promote a particular type 
of institution. Assumptions, policies, and regulations must be 
changed. Deposit services represent an attractive focus for 
these new policies and actions. This dimension of the inter-
mediation process presents considerable scope for innovation, 
because many more firms and households can be served through 
deposit facilities than through credit, while informal inter-
mediaries possess a comparative disadvantage in deposit mobili-
zation. Deposits, however, provide the rural population with 
an entry point into formal finance largely under their control 
and contribute to the establishment of their creditworthiness. 
The resulting "bank-customer relationship" reduces transaction 
costs for both borrowers and lenders. 
Rural deposit mobilization is not easy, as recent experi-
ments with agricultural development banks and credit unions have 
confirmed. While some of the development banks possess a large 
network of branches, due to their earlier expansion on the basis 
of "cheap" public or foreign funds, they did not accumulate the 
expertise required for deposit mobilization, and are finding it 
difficult to compete for funds in financial markets that are 
shrinking. The supply of the new deposit services, moreover, 
usually requires a long process of preparation and major organi-
zational changes. 
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Institutional understanding and political support for the 
reforms must be obtained. Policies and procedures need to be 
revised. Innovations must be introduced in order to reduce the 
transaction costs and the risks for depositors and increase their 
net returns. New dilemmas about institutional structure and 
strategy must be faced and "second-generation" problems need to 
be dealt with. Experiments, policy revisions, procedure changes, 
and learning processes are expensive and risky. Subsidies and 
public intervention may be needed to accelerate the innovation 
process, while external technical assistance can play a key role 
in promoting the changes and in financing some of the learning 
costs. 
Traditional approches to agricultural finance have relied on 
special credit projects for the disbursement of targeted loans in 
concessionary terms. This partial approach has not been successful. 
What is needed is a system-wide perspective that stresses market 
development, where different institutional and informal inter-
mediaries play a role according to their comparative advantages, 
and where all are linked through financial flows that integrate 
them into a single large national financial market network. 
The provision of rural financial services is a difficult and 
expensive task. The obstacles presented by the special nature 
of the rural economy can only be overcome with a major effort of 
policy reform, institution building, and technological change. 
Although much has been learned during recent experiments in RFM 
development, the task ahead is complex and demanding. 
First, an appropriate policy and regulatory environment has 
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accumulation of information, and financial innovations. The 
main focus of policies designed to promote RFM development 
should be changes in financial technologies that reduce trans-
action costs. Too much stress on lowering interest rates and 
on loan targeting have reduced emphasis on the urgent need to 
improve the production functions of financial services. 
The special nature of the rural economy in part explains the 
difficulties of providing rural financial services. Producers 
are very heterogeneous and geographically dispersed, their 
financial transactions are numerous and very small, and risks are 
high. The limited scope of the specialized agricultural-credit 
agencies explains part of the problem. Most of these institu-
tions are incomplete intermediaries, extremely specialized in 
the disbursement of loans, on concessionary terms, for narrowly 
defined target populations. While neglecting deposit mobiliza-
tion, they lack financial viability, experience high default 
rates, and impose high transaction costs on borrowers. The 
policies that repress rural incomes and increase their vari-
ability further aggravate the situation. LOw profits constrain 
the capacity to save, to place liquid reserves with financial 
institutions, to borrow, and to pay back loans. Rigid and 
misdirected financial policies accentuate the problems, by 
reducing the flexibility and profitability of the intermediaries 
that serve the rural areas, by imposing on them impossible tasks, 
or by forcing them to evade regulations by withdrawing from the 
countryside. The common difficulties experienced by all types 
of intermediaries suggest that the economic environment and the 
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to be created. If this environment is not hospitable, rural 
financial intermediaries will not grow. Positive real rates of 
interest on deposits and loans, less of the special and differen-
tiated rediscounting programs and isolated lines of credit, and 
more limited targeting must be among the major goals of financial 
policy reform. Development strategies to promote growth of 
rural incomes are also crucial. 
Appropriate policies, however, are not a sufficient condi-
tion for the expansion of RFMs. Given the magnitude and disper-
sion of transaction costs, which exclude many potential rural 
depositors and borrowers from access to financial services, new 
production functions of financial services are required. only 
low-cost technologies for deposit mobilization and loan disburse-
ment will make rural financial intermediaries viable and will 
increase rural access to finance. very little effort has been 
devoted to financial innovation, perhaps because the payoffs were 
limited under financial repression. As financial policy reforms 
provide the appropriate incentives, however, new technologies 
will be needed. viable, complete, low-cost institutions will 
have to be developed, to adopt and expand the use of the new 
technologies and provide the market linkages that guarantee the 
smooth operation of the whole system. 
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STRENGTHENING AGRICULTURAL BANKING AND CREDIT SYSTEMS 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 
Introduction 
The role of the financial system and the nature of its 
contributions to economic development have received increasing 
attention in Latin America and the Caribbean during the last 
decade, both in theory and in practice.~/ Inflation, the inter-
nationalization of financial markets, and the burden of foreign 
indebtedness explain renewed interest in financial development, 
from the macroeconomic perspective.~/ The lack of financial 
viability of many specialized development-credit institutions, 
high arrears rates, the low quality of the financial services 
offered, and other observed deficiencies of traditional credit 
projects, including those designed for the agricultural sector, 
explain an increasing concern, from the microeconomic perspec-
tive.3/ At the conceptual level, the pioneering work of Shaw, 
McKinnon, and their followers incorporated money, finance, and 
the operations of the banking system into models of growth and 
development in new ways, more appropriate for policy making.~/ 
Greater interest in the financial system and a better understand-
ing of its behavior and incidence have influenced policy 
decisions in many Latin American countries. 
Before the mid-1970s, inflation as a chronic problem was 
limited to a few countries, particularly those of the southern 
cone. During the last decade, inflation and the resulting 
negative interest rates, in real terms, have affected most of 
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the Latin American countries, including those in which prices 
had earlier been relatively stable, as in Central America and the 
Caribbean. In many countries, sustained inflation has been a 
consequence of the too rapid expansion of domestic credit, in 
nominal terms, in an attempt to finance public-sector deficits.~/ 
As a tax on the operations of the financial system, inflation 
has made domestic financial assets less attractive to hold, 
thereby aggravating the problem of financing investment and 
working capital. The resulting distortion and eventual destruc-
tion of some financial systems has attracted attention toward 
the importance of an efficient provision of financial services. 
Furthermore, attempts to overcome these difficulties and to 
stabilize the economy have produced their own problems, including 
too high real rates of interest in some countries, adding to the 
new concern about the performance of the financial system.~/ 
During the 1970s, world financial markets supplied increas-
ing volumes of funds to the Latin American and Caribbean coun-
tries. When foreign funds became less readily available and 
more expensive, however, these countries were forced to emphasize 
domestic resource mobilization. Given the burden of their external 
debt, several countries perceived that domestic funds mobili-
zation could help reduce their dependence on foreign financing. 
Also, many learned that when domestic financial assets offer 
less favorable returns than those available abroad, international 
markets attract funds from resident households and firms and that 
the domestic financial system shrinks with the resulting capital 
flight.7/ Thus, several governments have sought to enhance 
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the mobilization of private, voluntary savings through the 
financial system. 
In a few countries (notably Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay), 
increased attention to the role of finance accompanied major 
attempts to liberalize the economy, through reforms aimed at 
augmenting the role of the market mechanism and at reducing 
existing barriers to international trade and capital movements. 
There is no agreement among experts on the reasons for the lack 
of complete success of some of these efforts, but the experiences 
suggest that overcoming acute financial repression may be a 
difficult task and that important questions of implementation 
(timing, speed, and order of the policy reforms) must still be 
resolved.8/ 
Attention to the performance of rural financial markets 
(RFMs) and the financing of agriculture has increased in parallel 
with the renewed interest in finance and development.~/ Govern-
ments and donors have become increasingly concerned about the 
failure of traditional agricultural-credit programs to stimulate 
production and to reach a substantial proportion of the rural 
population. High transaction costs have reduced the viability 
of many intermediaries and have excluded many potential rural 
depositors and borrowers from access to institutional financial 
services. Transaction costs, incorrect pricing policies for 
financial services, and high default rates have bankrupt many 
agricultural-credit agencies. Research conducted by The Ohio 
State University's RFMs Project has shown that traditional 
agricultural-credit policies have resulted in increasing income 
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concentration, misallocation of resources, and greater market 
fragmentation in many countries.10/ 
Increased recognition of the importance of finance and of 
the negative consequences of policies that repress financial 
markets has encouraged aggregate financial reforms in several 
Latin American countries. There has been, in addition, a growing 
consensus that agricultural-credit policies and procedures need 
substantial changes, but reform has shown a tendency to bypass 
RFMs and to ignore the special problems of agricultural finance. 
This paper recognizes that a permanently improved provision of 
rural financial services in part depends upon sustained progress 
and integration of a national financial market. It urges 
policymakers not to neglect RFMs during their liberalization 
attempts, but it also claims that RFM development presents 
specific challenges that go beyond policy reform. The addi-
tional ingredients (institution building, inter-market linkages, 
and innovations in financial technologies), however, will not 
be successfully developed unless the policy environment becomes 
hospitable and encouraging. That is, unless policies, regula-
tions, incentives, and procedures are modified, and more viable 
institutions and cost-efficient financial technologies, appro-
priate for the provision of rural financial services in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, are designed and implemented, the 
contributions of finance to agricultural development, more 
food for all, and higher standards of living for the rural 
population will not be fully achieved. 
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The paper first examines the nature and importance of 
financial services. The difficulties of providing these services 
in the rural areas and the determinants of the urban bias of 
financial development are explored next. The following sections 
examine in detail the nature of these obstacles to RFM develop-
ment (financial and non-financial policies, the design of 
agricultural-credit programs and institutions, and the character-
istics of the rural economy) • The actions required to overcome 
these obstacles are outlined next. Special attention is given to 
deposit mobilization, market linkages, the reduction of transaction 
costs, the role of credit unions, and successful tools for a policy 
dialogue and institutional development. The role of central banks 
and of the donor's technical assistance is highlighted. 
Role of Financial services 
Recent contributions have looked at the financial system 
as a productive sector, with its industries, markets, prices, 
institutions, and policies. Financial firms combine inputs, 
in order to produce a complex set of financial services, mostly 
used as intermediate inputs into other production processes. 
Since resources are drawn away from other industries, the 
operation of the financial system is costly and it is justified 
only if it increases aggregate productivity sufficiently to 
compensate for its opportunity costs. 
The contributions of finance to economic growth result from 
the provision of several types of services.11/ The most basic 
is the provision of a means of payments. The monetization of the 
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economy reduces the costs of conducting transactions in commodity 
and factor markets, increasing the flow of trade and enlarging 
market size, and improving the productivity of resources through 
specialization and the division of labor, greater competition, 
the exploitation of economies of scale, and the use of modern 
technologies. 
Second, the financial system provides services of intermedia-
tion between surplus (savings) and deficit (investment) units.12/ 
In the absence of finance, some producers are condemned to take 
advantage of opportunities only to the extent allowed by their 
own resources, while others are forced to invest their marginal 
resources poorly, in "inferior" opportunities. There is no 
reason to expect that, at the same moment, those with the 
capacity to save are necessarily those with the best investment 
opportunities. By making the division of labor between savers 
and investors possible, the financial system helps allocate 
resources more efficiently, chctnnelling them from producers and 
regions of limited growth potential to those where more rapid 
expansion is possible. 
Intermediaries offer depositors new assets (e.g. bank 
deposits) that may be more attractive forms of holding wealth 
than marginal uses within the firm-household. This eliminates 
inferior uses of resources and increases the income of savers. 
In turn, claims on resources are transferred to borrowers, who 
possess productive opportunities that otherwise would be unex-
ploited. From this perspective, the financial system offers 
valuable services and income-increasing opportunities not only 
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to borrowers, who possess better options, but also to depositors, 
who at the margin only possess poor alternative uses for their 
funds. 
Third, the financial system facilitates risk, reserve, 
and liquidity management. Most households accumulate stores of 
value for emergencies or to take advantage of future investment 
opportunities. Reserves in the form of inventories of crops or 
inputs, livestock, land, precious metals and jewelry may yield 
low returns and impose high costs and risks. The financial 
system can reduce these costs and risks by offering attractive 
deposit opportunities for safe accumulation and lines of credit 
to cope with emergencies. Finally, the financial system also 
provides services of fiscal support for the public sector and 
contributes to the management of foreign exchange. correct 
financial policies must achieve an optimum balance in the 
provision of all of these financial services. 
Economic development both depends on and contributes to the 
growth and diversification of the financial system. Financial 
deepening and the provision of financial services matter, since 
they integrate markets, provide incentives for savings and 
investment, encourage savers to hold a larger proportion of their 
wealth in the form of domestic financial assets, rather than 
unproductive inflation hedges, foreign assets, and other money 
substitutes, and channel resources toward better alternative 
uses. Financial progress, however, results only from the 
reduction of risk and transaction costs, through the exploita-
tion of economies of scale and of scope, professional portfolio 
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management and diversification, the accumulation of information, 
and the establishment of bank-client relationships. Incorrect 
policies and regulations, on the other hand, repress financial 
development. The original fragmentation and distortions, 
combined with inappropriate policies, have curtailed the 
provision of financial services in the rural areas of Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Urban Bias of Financial Development 
The disparities between rural and urban growth and welfare 
observed in many Latin American and Caribbean countries persist 
because only a small proportion of investment goes to agriculture. 
The proportion of human capital and public services allocated to 
the rural sector is lower still. Rural-urban disparities have 
been accentuated by the deterioration of the terms-of-trade of 
agriculture and the encouragement for rural savings to flow to 
industrial investment, when the value of manufacturing output has 
been artificially boosted.~/ The urban bias of financial 
development reflects and contributes to this concentration of 
economic activity in the cities. 
The network of bank branches is concentrated in the urban 
areas. By far, the largest proportion of the funds and loans are 
mobilized and granted in the main cities.~/ Only a small 
proportion of the rural population has access to formal credit, 
from institutions that are prepared to offer loans, but no other 
type of financial services. Most of the funds disbursed by 
agricultural-development banks and a few other institutions with 
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some presence in the rural areas come from governments, central 
banks, and international donors. Few rural producers have access 
to deposit facilities. The consequence is limited intermediation 
between local savers and investors, resulting in large discrepan-
cies among marginal rates of return on rural investments and in 
missed opportunities for improved resource allocation. On the 
other hand, incomplete financial institutions, that do not 
mobilize deposits, lack financial viability and offer a poor 
service.15/ 
The special nature of the rural economy explains part of 
these results. Producers are widely dispersed and often less 
accessible, their financial transactions are numerous and very 
small, and they face higher risks and greater unexpected varia-
tions in prices and yields than producers in other sectors. 
The reduced scope of specialized agricultural-credit agencies 
and programs explains another part. Limited opportunities to 
diversify their assets increase the risk of their portfolios, 
the sources of their funds sharply restrict their flexibility 
and profitability, and in the absence of deposit mobilization 
they give up important information about their clientele. Rigid 
and misdirected financial policies, that reduce the degrees of 
freedom of financial institutions, impose on them impossible 
tasks, or severely constrain their profits, also explain part of 
the difficulties. Regulations of financial activity, prejudices 
against informal lenders, and restrictions to entry into institu-
tional financial markets contribute to the bias. Non-financial 
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policies that repress agricultural incomes further accentuate 
these problems. 
Design of Agricultural-Credit Programs 
The volume of agricultural credit granted in the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries continued to grow during most 
of the 1970s but, when measured in real terms, it declined in 
several countries during the financial crisis of the early 1980s. 
Although it cannot be claimed that all of the funds loaned for 
agricultural purposes have actually financed additional activi-
ties in the sector, their volume has been substantial.~ 
A large portion of these resources has come from international 
donors, since credit projects have continued to offer relatively 
expedient conduits for the disbursement of large sums, but 
domestic financial intermediaries have contributed increasing 
shares. In some countries, agricultural credit still represents 
the most important tool of strategies for rural development. 
The traditional design of these agricultural-credit programs 
has contributed to the urban bias of financial development. 
Multiple and often inconsistent objectives characterize many of 
them. The promotion of output expansion, modern input adoption, 
and on-farm investmPnt has been combined with attempts to help 
small producers and to attack rural poverty or to compensate 
farmers for the negative impact of other policies that repress 
agricultural profits and rural incomes. rt has been felt 
that the credit tool may be used to solve many problems and to 
achieve many different allocative and distributional objectives. 
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However, a better understanding of the nature of finance suggests 
that credit may not be an efficient mechanism for many of these 
traditional tasks and that attempts to use it as a cure-all 
medicine actually reduce its efficacy in achieving its main 
purpose: the intermediation of funds between surplus and 
deficit units.17/ 
If objectives are not clearly stated and the tasks 
assigned are incompatible, it is not surprising that many 
agricultural-credit programs show serious deficiencies. Although 
very little is known (and very little can actually be discovered) 
about the impact of credit, in many instances loans have not 
increased output or yields significantly (at least in the 
activities to which they were formally directed). Most of the 
specialized agricultural-credit institutions lack financial 
viability, as the policies for pricing their services do not 
allowed them to protect their assets from inflation or to 
cover their costs. Both lender and borrower transaction costs 
are too high. The implicit losses, combined with the eroding 
impact of inflation, have decapitalized many institutions, while 
others have experienced serious loan-recovery problems.~/ 
Moreover, despite the growth of lending, institutional 
credit markets continue to be characterized by limited access 
to financial services and high portfolio concentration.2!/ 
Only a small proportion of farmers has access to loans from 
formal financial intermediaries. There is reason to believe 
that the proportion of the rural producers of Latin America that 
receives institutional loans has not increased beyond 15 to 20 
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percent. At most, this proportion has reached 40 percent in a 
few countries; in several others it has not even surpassed 5 
percent.20/ In any case, the proportion of farmers who have 
access to institutional credit in a continuous, reliable, stable, 
and permanent fashion is much lower still. 
Among those priviledged enough to have access to institution-
al loans, a small proportion of their number receives a very 
large proportion of the funds disbursed. Typically, less than 10 
percent of the number of borrowers captures over 80 percent of 
the amounts loaned. This high deg~ee of portfolio concentration 
implies, in turn, a high degree of concentration of the incidence 
of the credit subsidy that usually characterizes agricultural-
credit programs, with undesirable income-distribution consequences. 
The combination of these three features (limited access, high 
concentration, and substantial subsidies) implies that about two 
percent of the agricultural producers of Latin America and the 
Caribbean have been the beneficiaries of at least 80 percent 
of the substantial volumes of credit granted and of a similar 
proportion of the large implicit subsidy.~/ Although several 
of these deficiencies characterize financial institutions and 
credit programs in general, they are particularly acute in the 
case of agricul tural.-lending agencies and projects. 
The Need for Viable Institutions 
The provision of rural financial services has been entrusted 
to traditional institutions (e.g., commercial banks) and to 
agencies and intermediaries created after world war II (e.g., 
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development banks, specialized credit projects, or credit 
unions). Although a wide variety of private and public institu-
tions have been harnessed for these purposes, agricultural-credit 
projects throughout Latin America and the Caribbean encounter 
many common problems. TO some extent, these commonalities 
reflect attempts to reproduce arrangements apparently successful 
elsewhere; they also reflect the unifying influence of donors. 
In part, they result from a generalized acceptance of unsatis-
factoy ~ priori assumptions about the behavior of depositors, 
borrowers, and intermediaries. The fact that very different 
classes of intermediary have experienced similar problems suggests 
that the economic environment as well as the financial and non-
financial policies discussed below have been more influential 
determinants of success than particular institutional forms. 
To reach the rural population with financial services it 
will not be sufficient, therefore, to choose or to promote 
particular kinds of institution. Viable, self-sustaining rural 
financial institutions have not yet emerged, in spite of all of 
the funds, subsidies, and technical assistance provided during 
the past decades to the Latin American agricultural development 
banks, federations of credit unions, and other private and public 
intermediaries.22/ Rather, what is needed is a better recogni-
tion of the factors that make RFMs (a network of interrelated 
formal and informal intermediaries) work. 
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Importance of Non-Financial policies 
The economic environment and the policies that influence the 
level and variability of rural profits and the farmers' debt-
repayment capacity are crucially important to the performance 
of RFMs.23/ The strength and growth potential of agricultural-
credit institutions depends upon the solvency and dynamism of 
their clientele. Farmers who receive low output prices, pay high 
input prices, obtain poor or unstable yields, and have limited 
access to markets and to public services cannot become good 
bank clients. LOw incomes and repressed profits constrain the 
farmers' capacity to save and to place their reserves and surplus 
funds with financial institutions, diminish their willingness to 
borrow and their opportunities to profitably allocate funds to 
their enterprises, and reduce their ability and desire to repay 
loans. Rural financial institutions have a better chance when 
agricultural yields are high, rural incomes are growing, and 
economic policies do not discriminate against farmers.24/ 
Many Latin American and Caribbean countries adopted protec-
tionist, import-substitution-industrialization strategies of 
development that repressed rural incomes.25/ Tariff barriers, 
tax incentives, foreign-exchange regimes, price controls, and 
subsidized food imports redirected private investment toward 
urban-based manufacturing activities and away from agriculture. 
These policies did not create an economic environment favorable 
to the development of RFMs. Nevertheless, declining output 
growth, due to the penalization of agriculture and of exports, 
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and an increasing recognition of the extent and nature of the 
distortions and of the costs resulting from the protectionist 
strategy have led to policy reforms in several Latin American 
and caribbean countries. A few are presently undergoing major 
structural adjustments, which place greater emphasis on appro-
priate incentives for agricultural development. These policy 
changes are crucial for the sustainable provision of rural 
financial services. 
The experience of the past decades shows that credit 
measures cannot correct for the negative impact of these repres-
sive non-financial policies and cannot compensate for the lack of 
profitability of rural investment. Subsidized credit is neither 
an efficient nor an equitable instrument to compensate farmers 
for the urban bias of public-sector investment and of pricing 
policies. While all farmers suffer the negative impact of these 
policies, only a few have access to the compensation implicit in 
the underpriced loans.~/ Frequently, these privileged borrowers 
are large producers, who possess additional investments in the 
favored non-agricultural sectors and need the compensation the 
least. 
Moreover, those who receive the credit subsidy may not 
necessarily modify their investment decisions. At the margin, 
the low profitability of agricultural endeavors will continue to 
justify the investment of resources elsewhere. Through internal 
substitution of funds, given their fungibility, producers with 
multiple sources of finance and diversified investment options 
will use the increased liquidity, resulting from their access 
- 16 -
to credit, for more attractive marginal purposes, different from 
those explicitly stated in loan contracts.27/ 
In summary, underpriced loans do not make unprofitable 
investments profitable. Credit, subsidized or not, cannot 
eliminate existing restrictions on profits. Credit does not 
make required inputs, that are not reliably supplied, available. 
Credit does not build the roads needed to take produce to the 
markets. Credit does not induce a market demand for crops that 
are not desired. Credit does not reduce the risks associated 
with variable-yield technologies~ rather, it increases these 
risks. Underpriced loans merely grant an income transfer to a 
few, while the activities financed remain unprofitable. Instead 
of attempting to compensate farmers with cheap credit, govern-
ments should devote their attention to the role of technology 
and of infrastructure development, in order to increase yields, 
and to the role of appropriate price incentives, in order to 
stimulate rural investment.2B/ 
Impact of Financial Policies 
In most Latin American and Caribbean countries, financial 
markets are still comparatively small and the range of rural 
financial services ~upplied is still fairly narrow. Poor 
resources, limited education, the isolation of economic agents, 
and lack of market integration stand in the way of financial 
development, particularly in the poorer and smaller countries. 
High transaction costs and risks make deposit and loan contracts 
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with formal institutions too expensive for many rural producers. 
rn most of these countries, moreover, financial repression has 
been substantially accentuated by government policies. 
The techniques of financial repression are numerous and 
widely practiced. They include high, variable, and unpredictable 
rates of inflation, that levy a tax on the holders of domestic 
financial assets and subsidize borrowers. Exchange-rate policies 
that overvalue domestic currencies make foreign financial assets 
look inexpensive and favor capital flight. Ceilings and other 
restrictions on the level and structure of interest rates and on 
the pricing of financial services reduce the ability of formal 
institutions to mobilize domestic resources and require non-price 
credit rationing. TOO high and unnecessarily differentiated 
reserve requirements tax away funds mobilized and increase the 
margins between deposit and loan rates of interest. Selective 
credit controls and administrative allocations of funds reduce 
the efficiency of financial intermediaries and increase trans-
action costs, while restrictions to entry to financial markets 
and constraints on portfolio management reduce competition and 
diminish the quality of services provided. Rediscounting 
schemes, foreign financial assistance, and access to other 
artificially cheap sources of funds discourage the mobilization 
of deposits from the public. 
Financial repression makes the returns on domestic financial 
assets unattractive. Rather than rewarding savers for their 
sacrifice of present consumption and inducing them to place their 
surplus funds with financial institutions, negative interest 
- 18 -
rates, in real terms, penalize them. Depositors not only do not 
receive attractive returns, but are implicitly asked to pay (a 
tax) to keep their savings in financial form. On the other hand, 
borrowers are implicitly paid (a subsidy) to take their loans 
away, to the extent that real loan rates of interest do not 
reflect the full value of the claims on resources transferred. 
Preferential rates for agricultural loans result in inverted 
interest-rate structures. The rate differentials do not reflect 
the costs and risks of lending to different borrower classes. 
Designed to favor marginal clients, these preferential rates 
force institutional lenders to charge the lowest rates precisely 
to those borrower classes they would have preferred to charge the 
highest possible rates, in view of costs and risks. Despite the 
good intentions behind these policies, the induced distortions in 
interest-rate structures eventually restrict the availability of 
credit for the borrower classes they are designed to favor.29/ 
Moreover, financial reform in several Latin American countries, 
allowing most interest rates to keep up with inflation, has 
maintained interest rates on ag~icultural loans at their original 
preferential levels and has further increased rate differentials 
and accentuated the resulting distortions. This is one of the 
reasons why it is i~portant that reform does not bypass rural 
finance. 
The policies that repress the financial sector accentuate 
the urban bias of its development. underequilibrium interest 
rates generate excess demands for loans that necessitate ration-
ing in order to clear the market. Rationing criteria frequently 
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prefer the value of collateral over the project's profitability. 
In several countries rural land is frequently not titled and 
often subject to risks of invasion or expropriation, reducing its 
value as collateral. Small farmers, in particular, are excluded 
from rationing processes based on mortgages, while urban-based 
agricultural firms receive the lion's share in the allocation of 
scarce funds for agriculture. 
Constrained by the imposition of ceilings on the rates of 
interest they are allowed to charge, institutional lenders find 
it difficult to cover the costs and the risks of mobilizing 
deposits in the rural areas and of granting credit to marginal 
clientele. cost-conscious institutions react by reducing the 
size of the loans they are willing to grant, by restricting the 
non-interest terms and conditions of the loan contracts, or both, 
thus excluding potential borrowers from access to loan portfolios. 
Rationing mechanisms frequently rely on transfering transaction 
costs from lenders to borrowers. Moreover, as financial repres-
sion increases, usually with the acceleration of inflation, the 
shares of loan portfolios received by poor, small, new, and 
riskier clients and by other borrower classes more costly to 
serve diminish, as predicted by the "iron law of interest rate 
restrictions."30/ These consequences of policy repression have 
been accentuated by the recent financial crisis experienced in 
several Latin American countries. As the real size of loan 
portfolios has shrunk with the crisis, rural clientele and, in 
particular, small farmers have been excluded from institutional 
credit more rapidly than urban clientele. 
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Transaction costs and Financial Progress 
The existence of a financial system can only be justified 
by the presence of costs in economic transactions. If economic 
activities were frictionless, if everybody had perfect foresight 
and if information was free, if transactions did not require time 
and effort to be completed, there would be no reason for money 
and financial activities to exist.31/ The monetary system is 
a response to the costs associated with conducting transactions 
in product and factor markets. Financial intermediation is an 
answer to the transaction costs associated with the direct 
contact between surplus and deficit units, the management of 
reserves, and the reduction of risk. The provision of financial 
services reduces overall transaction costs in the economy, but 
it does not completely eliminate them, while the process of 
intermediation itself introduces new costs. Financial progress 
is essentially a process of further reduction of transaction 
costs. 
What matters for productive and investment decisions and as 
an incentive for economic activity is the total cost of the funds 
to borrowers. What matters for savings behavior is the net return 
to depositors. The total cost of funds to borrowers includes, in 
addition to interest payments, explicit and implicit non-interest 
costs, such as lawyer, document, and registration fees, commis-
sions, forced purchases of other lender services, taxes, trans-
portation and lodging expenses, the opportunity cost of the time 
spent in conducting the credit transaction and in preparing 
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investment plans, the costs of entertainment, and bribes. 
compensating balances required from borrowers, delays in disburs-
ing funds and insufficient financing that results in lower yields 
also increase borrower costs. Net returns to depositors are 
reduced by taxes, penalties for early withdrawal, transportation 
and lodging expenses, and the opportunity cost of the time spent 
in depositing and withdrawing funds. In turn, margins must cover 
the intermediary's mobilization and lending costs and generate a 
profit. Mobilization costs, in addition to the rates paid on 
deposits, include the administrative expenses associated with the 
accounts, promotion costs, and the impact of reserve requirements 
Lending costs include the costs of handling loans (documentation, 
record-keeping, disbursement of funds and acceptance of payment}, 
the costs of reducing the risk of default (loan evaluation, 
monitoring, supervision, and collection), and the losses due to 
lack of payment. 
All components of the total transaction costs of rural 
financial activity in Latin America and the Caribbean are very 
high. For agricultural loans, in the case of the Nationalized 
Banking System of Costa Rica, during 1983 on the average non-
interest borrowing costs represented 11.5 percent per year, in 
addition to an average interest rate of 13.6 percent per year. 
While interest rates charged ranged between 8.0 and 26.5 per 
cent, non-interest borrowing costs ranged between 0.2 and 117.5 
per cent.32/ This enormous dispersion of transaction costs 
across borrowers signals major market fragmentation. Non-
interest costs of up to 12.0 percent of the loan amount, on the 
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average, were also measured for IDE-sponsored loans in three 
different countries.33/ since transaction costs per peso are 
negatively related to both loan and farm size, their incidence 
is highly regressive. Lending costs also tend to be very high. 
These costs amounted to up to 24.0 percent in the case of the 
IDE-sponsored credit projects mentioned above. In Honduras, 
these costs averaged 18.8 percent in the case of an agricultural 
development bank and 8.4 percent in the case of agricultural 
loans from a private commercial bank.34/ A substantial 
portion of borrowing and lending costs results from the loan 
targeting usually required by donors and reflects the screening, 
documentation, supervision, and extensive reporting requirements 
associated with a multitude of separate special lines of credit. 
Nature of the Rural Economy, Transaction costs, and Credit 
policies 
The provision of rural financial services is difficult and 
expensive even when financial and non-financial policies, program 
assumptions, and institutional design are adequate. The special 
nature of the rural economy explains this. Markets are fragment-
ed and information is expensive. Potential depositors and 
borrowers are very heterogeneous and geographically dispersed. 
Their financial transactions are numerous and small and they 
encounter substantial uncertainty and risks. Transaction costs 
are higher for rural than for urban agents due to limited 
education and lack of infrastructure. 
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High transaction costs reduce both the demand and supply of 
financial services. Non-interest borrowing costs make the total 
cost of the funds very high. Similar depositor costs make the 
net return to financial savings very low. Lenders perceive that 
the costs of managing numerous and small savings accounts and of 
determining the creditworthiness of small and diverse borrowers 
are very high. As a result, the size of RFMs is small and the 
variety of financial services provided is limited. An expansion 
of RFM activity is crucially dependent, therefore, upon a 
reduction of these transaction costs; then the costs of lending 
and of borrowing will decline and incentives to depositors will 
improve. 
If what matters is the total cost of funds to borrowers and 
the net return to depositors, the emphasis of regulatory activity 
on interest rates is misplaced. The traditional goal of "cheap 
credit" is obviously correct. Interest-rate ceilings, however, 
do not necessarily make credit cheap.~/ Interest-rate 
levels and transaction costs are not independent. Ceilings on 
loan rates of interest, that make it more difficult for formal 
intermediaries to service their rural clinetele, are frequently 
associated with more than proportional increases in non-interest 
borrowing costs and, therefore, with higher total costs of the 
funds.36/ Lenders faced with interest-rate ceilings clear the 
market by reducing the size of some loans granted, by charging 
implicit prices, and by restricting the terms and conditions of 
other loan contracts. All of these responses result in higher 
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non-interest borrowing costs and restrict access to credit in 
a nonuniform fashion.37/ 
Transaction costs cannot be reduced by decree. Credit 
cannot be made cheaper merely by setting interest-rate ceilings. 
Transaction costs will only decline with greater market inte-
gration and competition, economies of scale, division of labor 
and specialization, better utilization of existing capacity, 
and portfolio diversification. Aggregate financial development 
leading to deeper financial markets will reduce transaction 
costs. These costs will also decline with economies of scope 
and the joint production of several financial services. Deposit-
mobilization activities and the development of "bank-customer" 
relationships will reduce the costs of lending and of borrowing. 
Transaction costs will particularly decline with technological 
change: innovations such as electronic banking and the use of 
microcomputers, mobile branches, group lending, lending without 
collateral, and open lines of credit.38/ The expansion of 
the branch network and better hours of attention will also reduce 
these costs. Transaction costs will decline with the elimination 
of unnecessary regulatory constraints, the abandonment of loan 
targeting, the decentralization of bank management, and the 
simplification of procedures. 
The extent and location of the branch network and the degree 
of decentralization of loan approvals are key determinants of the 
level of transaction costs. For this reason, in a few countries 
governments have promoted rural banks or the expansion of the 
network of rural branches of national intermediaries.39/ 
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Although the extension of the branch network does increase 
access to financial services for the rural population it has 
been feared, however, that the funds mobilized may be channelled 
towards urban investments, further decapitalizing the countryside. 
The solution to this dilemma requires policy reforms based on 
a better understanding of the nature and role of the financial 
system. some intermediaries (e.g., credit unions) show a greater 
propensity to lend in the same area where they mobilize funds, 
but the aggregate flow of funds will depend on the incentives 
provided by financial and non-financial policies. 
Importance of Deposit Mobilization 
This paper claims that the role of financial institutions 
as intermediaries between savers and investors is crucial for 
economic growth. Intermediaries offer both credit services to 
deficit units and deposit facilities to surplus units. Both 
types of service are equally important, from the perspective both 
of income-increasing opportunities for private asset-holders and 
of aggregate economic efficiency and equity. Combined, deposit 
and loan services enhance the accumulation of capital and improve 
the allocation of resources. Traditional approaches to rural 
finance, however, have emphasized the demand for loans, while 
neglecting the demand for deposit facilities, despite numerous 
recommendations to the contrary.~/ The provision of deposit 
services, nevertheless, is a very attractive potential focus for 
new policies and actions aimed at expanding the degree of access 
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of the rural population of Latin America and the Caribbean to all 
financial services.41/ 
This facet of the intermediation process presents consider-
able scope for innovation because usually many more households 
and firms can be served through deposit facilities than through 
credit. Especially among those with relatively modest means or 
with stationary productive operations (in Schultzian equilibrium), 
the demand for financial services is primarily a demand for 
a safe and convenient means to manage liquid funds. Deposit 
services are used continuously and provide rural firm-households 
with an entry point into formal finance largely under their 
control. Small, short-term loans, on the other hand, are 
generally provided by informal credit sources at lower trans-
action costs for both borrower and lender, while institutional 
loans are demanded in response to special situations and oppor-
tunities and require creditworthiness. Informal intermediaries, 
however, offer none or only very limited deposit opportunities 
for the rural population. 
The deposit connection with the intermediary eventually 
facilitates access to loans.42/ savings activities contribute 
to the establishment of creditworthiness by providing information 
concerning financial. flows that could be tapped for loan repay-
ment, by creating a basis for confidence between lender and 
borrower, and by reducing the costs and risks of accumulating the 
minimum equity (downpayment) required for loan eligibility. The 
provision of deposit services is an strategically attractive way 
of expanding the range of interaction of formal intermediaries 
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with their existing clientele and of attracting new customers, 
thus promoting financial deepening in the rural areas. 
several Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Colombia, 
and Mexico, possess large institutional agricultural-credit 
systems, while others provide very limited rural financial 
services. The typical institutions are public specialized 
development banks and credit unions and cooperatives, created 
and financed with substantial donor assistance. Although 
development banks have been established in an attempt to bypass 
domestic financial repression, they have contributed little to 
its alleviation, while in many cases they have actually increased 
market fragmentation and transaction costs. Extremely dependent 
on outside funds, they have not sought deposits from the public, 
even when authorized to accept them. Credit unions have been 
more successful in some countries, but many have suffered 
decapitalization, high levels of loan delinquency, and limited 
operating efficiency. BOrrower-dominated, credit unions have 
not attracted savers as net depositors.43/ 
Most rural financial institutions neither offer attractive 
deposit facilities nor provide money-transfer services, store 
valuables for safekeeping, or serve as fiduciaries. Rather, 
they are "lending windows," retailers of loan funds received 
from donors and central banks on concessionary terms. They are 
incomplete financial institutions, specialized in processing 
loan applications and disbursing funds in conditions especially 
favorable to borrowers. In their structure and behavior they 
are borrower-dominated agencies.44/ Given their access to 
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underpriced resources, available to fulfill predetermined lending 
targets, these institutions face little compulsion and have 
little incentive to attract voluntary savings from rural firms 
and households.45/ 
This reliance on public funds makes these institutions 
vulnerable and dependent, as has become evident during the recent 
financial crisis. Given the growing claims of the public sector 
on domestic credit and the limits to each country's foreign debt 
capacity, access to "easy money" has turned illusory and several 
of these institutions have been forced to seriously cons~der the 
mobilization of domestic financial savings.46/ Dependence upon 
the national treasury and foreign donors also limits institu-
tional access to market information and prevents the development 
of "bank-customer relationships," crucial for efficient portfolio 
management. This may also result in the alienation of the agency 
from its clientele and in the borrowers' view of the credit 
programs as a benevolent intrusion to be exploited, leading to 
severe default problems.47/ Because attention is concentrated 
on a narrow range of credit dimensions, opportunities for port-
folio diversification are extremely limited, further increasing 
the risk of default. 
Obstacles to Deposit Mobilization 
While several of the financial institutions that serve the 
rural areas of Latin America and the Caribbean have been forced 
by the recent crisis to look for alternative sources of funds, 
they have discovered that deposit mobilization is not easy 
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and cannot be improvised. Unfortunately, during their earlier 
expansion on the basis of outside funds, these agencies did 
not accumulate the required experience and expertise in deposit 
mobilization, when resources were more plentiful and competition 
less keen. Their present financial structure and the pricing 
policies for their services sharply limit their ability to 
compete for funds now, in financial markets that are shrinking. 
In this respect, their extreme reliance on foreign or government 
funds may have weakened their ability to survive during periods 
of financial stress. 
In recent years, agricultural development banks and credit 
unions in several Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
initiated or expanded deposit-mobilization activities with 
relative success. Among the best known examples are those 
sponsored and recorded by The Ohio State university in Peru, 
Honduras, and the DOminican Republic.~/ Credit unions in other 
countries (e.g., Costa Rica) have also successfully improved 
their mobilization record by following similar policies. These 
closely monitored experiments have allowed a detailed identifica-
tion of obstacles and preconditions for mobilization as well as 
the testing of incentives, procedures, and policies for success-
fully attracting rural deposits. 
High transaction costs make financial savings unattractive 
for rural depositors. Long distances to bank branches, inconven-
ient hours of bank services, long lines and delays, and the 
small size of transactions related to savings accounts increase 
these costs and reduce the net returns on deposits. The success 
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of deposit mobilization activities among small rural savers, 
therefore, will crucially depend on the intermediary's ability 
to reduce these costs and/or to increase yields sufficiently to 
compensate depositors for their efforts. Security and liquidity 
are characteristics of deposit accounts highly valued among 
the rural population.~/ 
Although there has been a substantial increase in the number 
of bank branches in several Latin American and Caribbean countries, 
this has predominantly been an urban phenomenon.SO/ The spacial 
diffusion of bank offices into the rural areas observed in a few 
countries, moreover, has been mainly associated with the public 
development banks. Other non-bank intermediaries, such as the 
credit unions, have also penetrated the countryside, and their 
role is discussed below. Since bank rural branches have usually 
offered only loans but not deposit facilities, the existing 
banking infrastructure has been implicitly operated with an 
unutilized excess capacity. Wl1en this has been the case, the 
development banks should be in a position to offer deposit 
services at relatively low additional administrative costs. 
This has been the situation of Banco Agricola in the DOminican' 
Republic, where during the last year deposits were mobilized for 
the first time at 29 branches, with the addition of only three 
employees to the total of the bank's staff.51/ Where such a 
network of branches does not exist, deposit mobilization in the 
rural areas may seem too costly in the absence of innovative 
techniques.52/ 
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Given their presence in the rural areas through a network 
of branches and their links to an existing clientele, the agricul-
tural development banks have become major candidates for experi-
ments in rural deposit mobilization. While the observed defici-
encies of these institutions raise serious doubts about the 
success and sustainability of the mobilization efforts, this new 
dimension may contribute to the correction of several of these 
problems. The experiments sponsored by osu have shown that, 
although several preconditions are necessary for success, 
performance substantially improves after deposit mobilization. 
The operation of deposit facilities by an agricultural 
development bank that has not offered these services must usually 
be preceded by a long gestation period of complex preparation.S3/ 
An effective mobilization will not be accomplished unless the 
authorities, management, and staff of the institution are 
convinced that the efforts are desirable and feasible. Several 
methods may be used to bring about this institutional understand-
ing of the need for and benefits of deposit mobilization. The 
myth that the rural population does not possess assets that may 
be transformed into deposits and does not have a margin over 
consumption for further accumulation needs to be questioned. 
Evidence has to be provided in order to show that potential 
depositors do respond to higher returns, lower transaction 
costs, greater security and liquidity, and other economic 
incentives. The bank's management must understand the pro-
blems associated with subsidized credit, high default rates, 
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and dependence on outside financing if internal opposition 
is to be effectively dealt with.~/ 
similarly, political support for institutional and policy 
reforms must be obtained both from the domestic authorities and 
major donors. This is particularly crucial with respect to 
central banks, which will usually be requested to authorize the 
mobilization efforts and to set interest-rate structures, reserve 
requirements, and other determinants of the profitability of 
deposits. Technical assistance may play an important role in 
initiating thinking about the benefits of deposit mobilization, 
but local involvement in this process is crucial. In the case of 
the Dominican Republic, a combination of public discussion over 
several years, research by DOminican investigators, in-depth 
policy dialogue, and operational innovations on a pilot basis, 
supported and encouraged by flexible technical assistance, proved 
to be a powerful model for change.55/ The policy tensions 
associated with donor dissatisfaction with the performance of 
traditional credit projects and borrower resistance to raising 
interest rates created a climate propitious for this dialogue. 
The rapidly deteriorating financial situation of the 1980s forced 
the authorities to deal with these issues in more than academic 
terms. The harsh reality of more restrictive access to the 
traditional sources of funds created the required economic 
incentives for the new activities. This has in general 
motivated development banks to become more receptive to the 
proposed changes. 
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Policy and procedure reforms, experiments, and learning 
processes are expensive. Although there are important direct 
benefits to the development banks from deposit mobilization, 
costs may be too high. While available data from several 
countries supports the claim that poor rural households are 
capable of utilizing financial assets as reserves and sources of 
liquidity, the small size of the majority of the accounts itself 
raises operating costs substantially. Moreover, the intermediary 
may perceive the risks associated with a mobilization scheme as 
being too high, if its traditional clientele consists of wealth-
ier agents or if it can still obtain funds at lower costs from 
the central bank and other external source.56/ If these risks 
are due to information gaps and bureaucratic rigidities and 
inertias, there may be a case for public intervention in order 
to accelerate the innovation process.57/ rn any case, social 
returns to an expanded network of banking services in the rural 
areas seem to be usually higher than private returns to the 
intermediary, thus justifying a subsidy to the initial mobiliza-
tion activities, until an optimum is reached. External assis-
tance may play a key role, not only in inducing the changes, 
but also in helping to finance set up costs, including training, 
some promotional expenses, and the costs associated with changes 
in institutional structure and procedures. 
Deposit mobilization usually forces agricultural develop-
ment banks and other intermediaries to face new dilemmas about 
strategy and organization as well as additional institutional 
changes: that is, it becomes necessary to deal with a set of 
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"second-generation" problems.~/ The need to keep records and 
to calculate interest on the savings accounts frequently places 
additional burdens on the personnel and may overload existing 
information systems, possibly bringing to light its deficiencies 
and inducing a modernization. Experiments with microcomputers, 
to reduce data management costs, may be tried.59/ Branch 
managers must quickly convert mobilized funds into loans, but 
must also find clients with a high probability of repayment, 
since it would not be acceptable to lose one's neighbor's 
savings. Given their previous experience with very high 
delinquency, the managers of the public development banks have 
to learn to make lending decisions quickly, while still being 
very selective among borrowers. As a result, the institution 
is faced with a revision of its portfolio management techniques. 
With a new awareness about profitability, the intermediary also 
recognizes the need to reduce the costs associated with deposit 
and loan operations and with Gclinquency as well as to increase 
revenues from interest. All of this brings about new changes 
in institutional structure, policies, and procedures, and may 
sometimes raise fundamental questions about national financial 
policies and regulations. 
In general, thP introduction of deposit mobilization 
activities creates imbalances and brings to light deficiencies 
that necessitate correction. If successful, the experiment will 
lead to a global evaluation and restructuring of the intermediary 
and to a revision of financial policies, thus increasing institu-
tional viability and improving the quality of the financial 
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services provided in the rural areas. The institutional tensions 
created will usually require changes in information and data-
management systems, the degree of operational decentralization, 
portfolio management and delinquency control, and standards 
of administrative efficiency. In addition, all of this will 
require a reconsideration of the institution's human resources 
strategy and considerable amounts of training. Change within the 
institution must take place rapidly and on many fronts, further 
adding to the fragility of the experiment. Technical assistance 
can play a key role in facilitating a major training effort and 
the consolidation of the reforms. 
The development of rural financial markets is a complex and 
expensive exercise that requires several public interventions. 
Although in the past central banks have shown little interest in 
rural finance, they can play a key role in initiating desired 
reforms and sponsoring useful experiments.60/ Their major 
contribution, of course, will result from sound aggregate 
financial policies, that control inflation and minimize policy-
induced distortions. Effective supervision and inspection of 
institutional intermediaries, that increase depositor confidence, 
are also a necessary task. This may be complemented by well-
designed deposit-insurance mechanisms. Central banks may also 
become a major force behind the expansion of a viable branch 
network, promoting and overseeing their operations. Central 
banks frequently possess a strong research capability that is 
seldom addressed toward RFM issues. With donor support and 
technical assistance they may accept a leading role in the 
- 36 -
investigation of these questions and the promotion of pilot 
projects and other experiments, as has been the case in the 
Dominican Republic. 
Role of Credit unions 
Credit unions possess many features that could allow them 
to become, if appropriate policies were adopted, an important 
mechanism to improve the access of the rural population to 
financial services. They are local intermediaries of funds, 
that can successfully solve the information problem that limits 
the operations of most financial institutions: their board of 
directors possesses substantial "inside knowledge" about the 
creditworthiness of potential borrowers. The proximity of their 
operations and the employment of volunteer labor allow them to 
offer small, short-term loans at relatively low transaction costs 
for both borrowers and lender.61 These features provide credit 
unions with substantial comparative advantages to initiate the 
supply of financial services in the rural areas. As they grow, 
however, professional management is required and some of the 
informational advantages are lost. Credit unions become more 
like a small bank and transaction costs may increase, but they 
still retain the ad,rantages of local intermediation. By serving 
the financial needs of different productive sectors, they also 
find some opportunities for portfolio diversification. 
Credit unions thus have many attractive features, but their 
financial policies and organization frequently make it difficult 
for them to meet the expectations placed on them.62/ Although 
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they were originally designed as complete intermediaries, first 
to mobilize local savings and then to provide loans to local 
borrowers, in practice they have been borrower-dominated institu-
tions. In particular, access to external subsidized funds has 
biased their internal structure of incentives, resulting in 
little mobilization of deposits from net savers and in high 
delinquency rates.63 
In several Latin American countries there is a core of 
well-run, self-capitalized rural credit unions, that have 
mobilized significant amounts of funds, as well as a multitude of 
"problem" institutions. The instruments used for the mobiliza-
tion of local funds, however, have been almost exclusively the 
traditional share accounts. since the returns on these shares 
are not attractive, the only incentive to deposit in the credit 
union has been the expectation to obtain a loan. This brings to 
light the basic problem with the design of these credit unions 
and the potential conflict of interests in their operations. If 
members deposit only to obtain a loan, the extent to which this 
service can be provided by the credit unions depends on their 
degree of access to external funds. This is why the credit 
union's credit policy always limits the maximum amount of a loan 
to be granted as a proportion of the share holdings. If these 
loans were three times the amount of shares, the credit union 
would need to obtain 75 percent of its funds from external 
sources. Thus, rather than net savings, the shares represent a 
compensatory balance to qualify for the loans and significantly 
increase the effective interest rates paid by the borrowers. 
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For example, if the loan-to-shares ratio is 2:1 and the nominal 
interest rate is 15 percent, the effective rate is 25 percent. 
Expansion of these credit unions in Latin America thus has 
had to rely on considerable donor support in order to fulfill the 
expectations of members to obtain loans larger than their share 
holdings. Eventually, however, external assistance has been 
mostly phased out, while there has been little recuperation of 
funds previously disbursed. Rather than increasing interest 
rates explicitly in order to ration credit, the credit unions 
have reduced the loan-to-shares ratio accordingly, thus impli-
citly increasing the effective cost of the funds. This has 
reduced the quality of their service and many members have 
decided to withdraw by requesting "automatic" loans for the 
amount of their shares. Thus, much of the existing "capital" 
of these credit unions would have to be compensated for the 
defaulted loans, in order to ascertain the net volume of local 
funds mobilization. 
Deposit mobilization by the credit unions, beyond these 
shares, has been jeopardized by the way the conflict of interests 
among the members (borrowers versus savers) has been handled. 
All gains from participation have been allocated through the low 
interest rates charged on loans (and loose collection of loans), 
while depositors have not received attractive rewards. What is 
needed are new instruments to attract deposits as well as incen-
tives for some members to become net depositors. That is, credit 
unions need to become less borrower-dominated and to incorporate 
depositors in their administration. The osu experiments show 
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that changes in the composition of the membership induced by a 
different interest-rate structure sharply increase loan collection 
and improve performance in general. This transformation, however, 
is not easy and it requires large doses of political persuasion, 
training, institutional reforms and procedure and policy changes 
similar to those needed by the agricultural development banks. 
Fortunately, this can be usually accomplished by transformation 
from within, since credit unions are subject to less regulatory 
intrusions than the banking system. 
Institutional and Informal Intermediaries 
RFMs consist both of formal intermediaries and informal 
agents. Each one of these market participants provides services 
that are legitimate and appropriate for different types of client. 
Each one possesses specific comparative advantages that are re-
flected in the magnitude of the resulting transaction costs. 
Non-financial agents (processing, marketing, exporting firms) 
also provide useful financial services. Financial policies and 
strategies must promote the development of all types of inter-
mediary as well as an efficient division of labor among them. 
very little is known about informal financial markets in 
Latin America and the Caribbean.64/ Borrowing and lending within 
and across family units is common in the rural economy, while 
moneylending is frequently linked to the roles of landlord and 
trader. The landlord-moneylenders usually provide seeds and 
other working capital to tenants and receive interest in kind. 
The merchant-moneylenders extend advances to small farmers and 
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purchase their crop. MOre complex informal savings and credit 
associations and local bankers appear to be comparatively less 
important in Latin America than in Asia or Africa.65/ Pawn-
brokers are found in several countries, but savings clubs are 
of minor importance. Most important are financial arrangements 
associated with major marketing channels: tobacco, coffee, 
cacao, and sugar cane processors and fresh fruit and vegetable 
exporters, as well as truckers, grocery stores, and input 
suppliers. These agencies, like credit unions, represent effi-
cient retailers of funds, but are in turn very dependent upon 
their links to other institutions specialized in the wholesaling 
of funds, since their own resources are limited and subject to 
seasonal demands. Marketing-cum-credit intermediaries do not 
mobilize deposits and flourish only if they have access to a 
pyramidal network linking them to major sources of funds. 
Because of their operations, however, they can provide some 
financial services at low tra11saction costs and can control 
loan delinquency. As a result, their relationships with formal 
intermediaries are at the same time competitive and comple-
mentary. 
With financial development, however, institutional inter-
mediaries grow fast~r than informal markets. Increased competi-
tion lowers interest rates on loans and increases returns to 
depositors. Complementarity results from the pyramiding of 
financial relationships: borrowers from institutional interme-
diaries may be in a good position to, in turn, informally lend to 
others, more costly to serve for the formal agency. Interactions 
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between formal and informal agents further reduce fragmentation 
and integrate financial markets. Such dynamic connection lowers 
transaction costs and increases access to financial services. 
In the past, government intervention has been directed toward 
the elimination of the informal sector, ignoring the importance 
of its services. The close regulation of the formal sector, 
moreover has reduced its ability to compete with the moneylender. 
This strategy has not been satisfactory. A new policy approach 
must recognize and promote the intricate and wide-ranging 
relationships among several kinds of financial agents in a 
closely integrated market. 
Conclusion 
The provision of rural financial services is a difficult and 
expensive task. The obstacles presented by the special nature of 
the rural economy can only be overcome with a major effort of 
policy reform, institution building, and technological change. 
Although much has been learned during recent experiments in RFM 
development, the task ahead is complex and demanding. 
First, an appropriate policy and regulatory environment has 
to be created. If this environment is not hospitable, rural 
financial intermediaries will not grow. Positive real rates of 
interest on deposits and loans, less of the special and differen-
tiated rediscounting programs and isolated lines of credit, and 
more limited targeting must be among the major goals of financial 
policy reform. Development strategies that promote growth of 
rural incomes are also crucial. 
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Appropriate policies, however, are not a sufficient condi-
tion for the expansion of RFMs. Given the magnitude and disper-
sion of transaction costs, which exclude many potential rural 
depositors and borrowers from access to financial services, new 
production functions of financial services are required. Only 
low-cost technologies for deposit mobilization and loan disburse-
ment will make rural financial intermediaries viable and will 
increase rural access to finance. very little effort has been 
devoted to financial innovation, perhaps because the payoffs were 
limited under financial repression. As financial policy reforms 
provide the appropriate incentives, however, new technologies 
will be needed. viable, complete, low-cost institutions will 
have to be developed, to adopt and expand the use of the new 
technologies and provide the market linkages that guarantee the 
smooth operation of the whole system. 
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